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IS THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR
COOPERATION WORKING FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS?
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)', is
the product of labor concerns2 arising out of the ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).' This side agreement to
NAFTA addresses the concerns of all three Parties to the agreement
("Parties"): the United States, Canada, and Mexico.' These concerns
include: the export of jobs from the United States,' inadequate health and
safety conditions for workers in Mexico,6 lower Mexican labor standards,7
and lack of enforcement of Mexican labor laws.' Signing the NAALC on
September 13, 1993, the three Parties set forth goals to alleviate these
concerns. 9 More significantly, the agreement establishes methods to both
discourage their realization and to resolve them, should such matters
nevertheless arise. 10
The NAALC Parties pledged to encourage compliance with and enforce-
ment of their respective labor laws." They also pledged to promote eleven
"Labor Principles," subject to each Party's domestic law. 2 These princi-
ples include freedom of association and protection of the right to organize,
the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike. 13  The labor
1. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Mex-Can., Sept. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
2. Elizabeth C. Crandall, Comment, Will NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation Improve Enforcement of Mexican Labor Laws?, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 165, 167
(1994).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Sept. 17, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
296 (1993). The treaty was approved by Congress on November 17, 1993, and according to
article 2203 entered into force on January 1, 1994.
4. NAALC, supra note 1, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 1502.
5. Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391, 427 (1993).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 431.
9. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515. The Annex provides:
The following are guiding principles that the Parties are committed to
promote, subject to each Party's domestic law, but do not establish common
minimum standards for their domestic law. They indicate broad areas of concern
where the Parties have developed, each in its own way, laws, regulations, procedures
and practices that protect the rights and interests of their respective workforces.
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
2. the right to bargain collectively
3. the right to strike
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principles engender controversy because of the manner by which the agree-
ment divides them.
All labor matters encompassed by the principles of freedom of associa-
tion and protection of the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively
and the right to strike may be referred to as industrial relations matters. 14
The NAALC regards all other labor principles as "technical labor stan-
dards. "'5 Although both types of matters are initially addressed by the same
enforcement mechanisms, greater dispute resolution options exist under the
NAALC for technical labor issues than for violations of industrial relations
principles. 6 Technical labor principle violations are subject to the full
extent of the dispute settlement procedures outlined in the NAALC.17 On
the other hand, the industrial relations principle violations are restricted to
more limited resolution procedures." Significant among these limitations
is the lack of a monetary penalty option which is available for technical labor
violations. 9  These limitations on enforcement of industrial relations
principles show the most significant weakness of the NAALC.
The labor agreement also establishes the trinational Commission for
Labor Cooperation2" to promote information exchange and cooperative
4. prohibition of forced labor
5. labor protections for children and young persons
6. minimum employment standards
7. elimination of employment discrimination
8. equal pay for women and men
9. prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses
10. compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses
11. protection of migrant workers.
14. Crandall, supra note 2, at 186 n.181.
15. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1513.
16. Ronald W. Kleinman & Joel M. Shapiro, NAFTA's Proposed Tri-Lateral Commissions
on the Environment and Labor, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 25, 28 (1994).
17. See infra notes 28-63 (discussing the resolution of alleged technical labor principle
violations).
18. See infra part I.A. (discussing the limitations on resolution of alleged industrial
relations matters).
19. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 39, 32 I.L.M. at 1511, 1512.
20. Id. pt. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1504-07. The Commission is comprised of and supported by
four major bodies. The Council consists of the three Parties' labor ministers. The Secretariat,
which supports the Council, is headed by an Executive Director who serves a three year term.
The position rotates between a national from each Party. The National Administrative Offices
are established by each federal government and serve as the point of contact in each country for
information and submissions of labor matters arising in the territory of another Party. Finally,
articles 17 and 18 establish the right of each Party to form National Advisory Committees and
Governmental Committees respectively, and to advise on the implementation and elaboration of
this agreement. Id.
2
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activities and to serve as the dispute resolution mechanism between
Parties.21 It is this labor dispute settlement procedure, in the context of
industrial relations matters, that is the focus of this comment.22
On February 14, 1994, only one and a half months after the NAALC
came into effect, two complaints for alleged labor violations in Mexico were
submitted to the United States National Administrative Office. 23  One was
filed by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE)
alleging labor principle violations by General Electric (GE) in Mexico.24
The other complaint was filed by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(IBT) alleging violations of principles by Honeywell, Inc. (Honeywell) in one
of its Mexican factories.' The unions' complaints primarily concerned the
right to organize and freedom of association.26
This comment discusses the NAALC's procedures for settling labor
disputes, in light of their first application, emphasizing industrial relations
matters and the role of the National Administrative Office (NAO). Part I
discusses the NAALC procedures for resolution of alleged labor principle
violations by a Party. Part II presents the facts and circumstances leading to
the submissions of the first two complaints. Part III describes the NAO's
decisions based on its review of the two unions' submissions. Part IV
analyzes that review and its impact on the credibility of the NAALC. Final-
ly, Part V discusses the role of the NAO in future industrial relations dis-
putes.
I. NAALC PROCEDURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF LABOR DISPUTES
A. General Procedures
Each Party's labor law enforcement obligations under the NAALC are
best described by former Acting Secretary of the U.S. NAO, Jorge F. Perez-
Lopez:
[Tihe obligation undertaken in Article 3 by each signatory is to "promote
compliance with and effectively enforce" its own labor law. That is, the
Agreement requires each signatory to enforce all of the labor laws that it
21. Id. arts. 10-11, 32 I.L.M. at 1505-06.
22. For additional background of its evolution and specific articles of the NAALC see
generally Crandall, supra note 2.
23. NAFTA Labor Protections Put to Test as Mexican Workers Testify Before NAO, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept. 14, 1994).
24. National Administrative Office, Submission #940002, Feb. 14, 1994 [hereinafter
Submission 2]. Submissions of complaints filed with the National Administrative Office are
available under the Freedom of Information Act from the U.S. National Administrative Office,
Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 200 Constitution Ave., NW, Rm.
C-4322, Washington, D.C. 20210.
25. National Administrative Office, Submission #940001, Feb. 14, 1994 [hereinafter
Submission 1].
26. Id.; Submission 2, supra note 24.
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has in place, but this obligation does not extend to enforcing the laws of
another Party.27
Any individual may submit for NAO review concerns as to possible
labor principle violations, whether technical labor standards or industrial rela-
tions matters. 2  The submission must allege a violation in another Party's
territory. 29 A citizen of a Party country may not submit a complaint to his
or her own country's NAO alleging a domestic labor violation. Such matters
are more appropriately addressed by domestic labor authorities. After filing,
that country's NAO Secretary determines whether the issues raised are
"relevant to labor law matters in the territory of another Party and if a
review would further the objectives of the Agreement. "3 Based on this
standard, if the NAO decides to review the matter it will begin gathering
information from various sources, 3 including possible exchanges of
information between the Parties' NAOs.32 Generally, the NAO holds a
hearing and issues a subsequent report." The report includes a summary
of the proceedings as well as the NAO's findings and recommendations.34
If the Secretary of the NAO finds the accused Party has not resolved the
dispute after the NAO publishes its report, she may recommend that the
Secretary of Labor request ministerial consultations with his counterpart in
the country where the matter arose.35 The Parties will then attempt to
resolve the matter by consultation and exchange of publicly available
information.36
If ministerial consultations prove unsuccessful for resolving the dispute,
any consulting Party may request the establishment of an Evaluation
27. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Remarks at the United States - Mexico Law Institute Conference,
Santa Fe, New Mexico (Sept. 15-17, 1994) [hereinafter Perez-Lopez Remarks].
28. Revised Notice of Establishment of U.S. National Administrative Office and Procedural
Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660, 16,661 (1994) [hereinafter Revised Notice].
29. Id. at 16,661.
30. Id. This broad standard, established by the U.S. NAO, is its only specified guideline
for determining appropriate subject matter for review. It appears that nearly any fact supported
submission alleging nonenforcement by a Party of its labor laws would satisfy the standard.
31. Id. at 16,662. "[T]he Office shall conduct such further examination of the submission
as may be appropriate to assist the Office to better understand and publicly report on the issues
raised." Id.
32. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 21, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-08. This article allows the investi-
gating NAO to obtain information from its counterpart in the country where an issue has been
raised. Information as to that country's labor laws, their administration, or labor market
conditions in the area may be requested. Furthermore, any NAO may participate in the
consultations if proper notice is provided to the other NAOs and the Secretariat.
33. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662. "The Secretary shall hold promptly a
hearing on the submission, unless the Secretary determines that a hearing would not be a suitable
method for carrying out the Office's responsibilities ... " Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
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Committee of Experts (ECE).37 However, an ECE may only be established
if the matter is trade-related38 or the matter is encompassed by mutually rec-
ognized labor laws.3 9
The ECE analyzes, in a non-adversarial manner, patterns of a Party's
enforcement of its technical labor laws.' It may receive information for
review from any Party's NAO, the Secretariat, organizations with relevant
expertise and even the general public. 4' The NAALC provision on ECEs
only addresses technical labor matters. Therefore, industrial relations
concerns, such as the right to organize and bargain collectively, cannot be
reviewed by an ECE.42
An ECE usually consists of three labor experts.43 The chair of the
committee is selected by the Council from a roster of experts developed in
conjunction with the International Labor Organization." The other
members are selected, when possible, from lists developed by the Parties.45
All ECE members are experts on labor or any field related to the matter. 6
They are selected on a "basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judg-
ment."47  The experts must be independent from the Parties and the
Secretariat." Finally, the ECE reviews the issue pursuant to a code of
conduct established by the Council.49
If the dispute pertains to technical labor standards, the ECE will issue
37. Id. art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
38. Trade-related is defined as:
[R]elated to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that
produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the Parties;
or (b) that compete in the territory of the Party whose labor law was the subject of
ministerial consultations under Article 22, with goods or services produced or
provided by persons of another Party.
Id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14.
39. Id. art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
40. Id. The nature of the NAALC encourages cooperation and negotiation rather than con-
frontational methods of resolving disputes. This need for cooperative activities arises from an
inability to enforce the domestic labor laws of another Party. See Perez-Lopez Remarks, supra
note 27. See also supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
industrial relations matters and technical labor standards).
41. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1058.
42. Crandall, supra note 2, at 186.
43. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
44. Id. The Parties develop this roster with the International Labor Organization pursuant
to article 45 of the NAALC, which states, "The Parties shall seek to establish cooperative
arrangements with the ILO to enable the Council and Parties to draw on the expertise and
experience of the ILO for purposes of implementing Article 24(1)." Id. art. 45, 32 I.L.M. at
1513.
45. Perez-Lopez Remarks, supra note 27.
46. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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a Draft Evaluation Report." This report is delivered to the NAALC-
established Council." Each Party involved in the matter may then respond
to the recommendations made in the report. 2 The ECE considers this
input, then develops its Final Evaluation Report. 3 The recommendations
in this report are made available to the Council and the Parties involved in
the matter. The Parties then meet for consultations and, using this report,
attempt to arrive at a "mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter."
54
If these consultations do not result in a successful resolution, a Party
may request a special session of the Council. 5 In this special session the
Council may make recommendations to the Parties, suggest other forms of
dispute resolution, such as mediation, consult technical advisers, or create
working groups of experts.56
If the technical labor matter remains unresolved a Party may request that
the Council establish an Arbitral Panel. 7 This panel of labor law experts,
selected from a Council-maintained roster, 8 reviews the dispute and issues
a Final Report 9.5  The panel determines if a persistent pattern6° of labor
violations has occurred and may coordinate a plan to remedy the inappropri-
ate activities, if the Parties cannot establish such a plan themselves. 6' If a
Party does not comply with the plan, a monetary enforcement assessment
may be implemented under Annex 39.62 Failure to pay a monetary enforce-
ment assessment entitles the other interested Party or Parties to suspend
NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater than the monetary enforcement
50. Id. arts. 23-25, 32 I.L.M. at 1508-09.
51. Id. art. 26, 32 I.L.M. at 1509. The Council convenes regularly once a year and in
special sessions at the request of a Party. Id. art. 9, 32 I.L.M. at 1505. See also supra note
20 and accompanying text (discussing the organizational bodies within the Commission for Labor
Cooperation).
52. Id. art. 25, 32 I.L.M. at 1508-09.
53. Id. art. 26, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
54. Id. art. 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
55. Perez-Lopez Remarks, supra note 27.
56. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 28, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
57. Id. art. 29, 32 I.L.M. at 1509-10.
58. Id. art. 30, 32 I.L.M. at 1510.
59. Id. art. 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1511.
60. Id. art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14. Pattern of practice is defined as "a course of action
or inaction beginning after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, and does not include
a single instance or case." Id.
61. Id. art. 39, 32 I.L.M. at 1511-12.
62. Id. Annex 39 contains three provisions related to monetary enforcement assessments.
The first provision sets a maximum amount which is twenty million dollars for 1994, and no
greater than .007 percent of total trade in goods between the Parties during all subsequent years.
The second provision lists considerations to be used by the panel in establishing the assessment
amount. These considerations include: the pervasiveness and duration of the persistent pattern
of violation, the reasonably expected level of enforcement, reasons for not implementing the
action plan, efforts to remedy patterns of violations and any other relevant factors. The last
provision establishes that the paid assessment shall be expended at the Council's direction to
improve labor law enforcement in the violating country. Id. Annex 39, 32 I.L.M. at 1516.
[Vol. 25
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assessment .
6 3
Dispute resolution procedures for industrial relations matters do not
extend beyond the ministerial consultations' of the NAALC's article 22.65
Because of this more limited procedure, the NAO assumes a more significant
role as a dispute settlement mechanism for industrial relations concerns. The
NAO's recommendations to its respective labor ministers will generally be
the only source of resolution when another Party has allegedly failed to
enforce the principles of freedom to associate and the right to organize, the
right to bargain collectively, or the right to strike.
Each Party's NAO shares a close relationship with its labor minister.
The NAO's recommendations to its respective minister will establish a
foundation for consultations. The Secretary of the NAO, in fact, makes the
recommendation to the minister as to whether consultations are appropri-
ate.66 Lacking further dispute resolution procedures, such as the ECEs and
the monetary enforcement assessment, the NAO's effectiveness and creativity
are crucial to the resolution of these industrial relations disputes.
B. The Role of the NAO
Each Party's NAO establishes its own guidelines for submission of labor
matters arising in another Party's territory. 67 This Party-individualized
system for receipt and review of submissions ensures that the procedure is
consistent with each Party's domestic procedures.6" The U.S. NAO
established its policies in the Revised Notice of Establishment of U.S.
National Administrative Office and Procedural Guidelines.69 These rules
state that any person may file a submission regarding labor law matters
arising in the territory of another Party.7" The rules require that the
submitter be clearly identified, and that the complaint be signed and dated. 7
The submitter must state with specificity the matters to be considered and
provide any supporting information available.72
The guidelines also establish certain elements that the submitter should
address in the complaint. First, the matters complained of should demon-
63. Id. art. 41, 32 I.L.M. at 1512-13.
64. NAO Decides to Review Union Charges Against Honeywell, General Electric, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 75, at D-14 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter NAO Decides to Review].
65. The subsequent articles dealing with "Cooperative Consultations and Evaluations" as
well as "Resolution of Disputes" specify that they address only technical labor standards. See
generally arts. 23, 27, 29 and 39, 32 I.L.M. at 1508-12.
66. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
67. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
68. Perez-Lopez Remarks, supra note 27.
69. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,660.
70. Id. at 16,661.
71. Id.
72. Id.
7
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strate action inconsistent with the Parties obligations under the NAALC.73
Second, there should be harm to the submitter or another as a result of the
labor law violation.74 Third, the complaint should "demonstrate a pattern
of non-enforcement of labor law by another Party. 75 Fourth, the complaint
should indicate whether relief has been sought under the domestic laws of the
Party accused of violations and, the status of those legal proceedings.76
Finally, the submitter should indicate if the matter is pending before an
international body.77
The Secretary of the NAO determines within sixty days whether the
matter should be reviewed .78 The general standard is whether the issues
raised are "relevant to labor law matters in the territory of another Party and
if a review would further the objectives of the Agreement. 79 The request
for review may be rejected if the submission requirements are not met. 80
The request may also be rejected if the allegations do not constitute a
violation of Part Two of the NAALC.8l Finally, a request may be rejected
if appropriate relief has not been pursued under domestic laws of another
Party, if the complaint is pending before an international body, or if the
request is substantially similar to another recent submission and provides no
new significant information.82
If the NAO determines review is appropriate, the Secretary notifies the
Parties and publishes the rationale for the review in the Federal Register.83
If the NAO decides not to review the matter, it promptly provides a reason
for its decision.'
The NAALC establishes an extensive procedure for resolving labor
matters that arise in a Party country. Under this procedure disputes may be
resolved in an orderly and cooperative manner. However, it remains unclear
73. Id. The NAALC's Part Two "Obligations," consists of articles 2-7 of the agreement.
They establish the obligations of each Party, including: the obligation to set and promptly
publish high labor standards, ensure their enforcement, allow private rights of action for their
enforcement, maintain fair procedures for enforcement and promote public awareness of the
labor laws. NAALC, supra note 1, arts. 2-7, 32 I.L.M. at 1503-04.
74. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,661.
75. Id. For a definition of "pattern" see supra note 60 (discussing the definition of "pattern
of practice").
76. Id. The Guidelines do not specify that all local remedies must necessarily be exhausted
but, merely request that the submitter indicate the status of such domestic proceedings in the
complaint.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing the goals and objectives
of the NAALC).
80. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,661.
81. Id. at 16,661-62. Part Two of the NAALC is titled "Obligations," and consists of
articles 2-7 of the agreement. NAALC, supra note 1, arts. 2-7, 32 I.L.M. at 1503-04.
82. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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whether the NAALC can effectively resolve industrial relations matters,
which do not qualify for the majority of the extensive resolution proce-
dures.85
II. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE FIRST
COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE NAO
Both the UE and the IBT submitted complaints to the NAO on February
14, 1994.86 The complaints were directed at Mexican subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations, General Electric and Honeywell, Inc., respectively.87  Both
submissions alleged violations of industrial relations matters by each
subsidiary's management.88 Although the complaints were fact specific to
the two companies, they asserted the companies' actions resulted in
nonenforcement of labor laws by the Mexican government.89 In its decision
to review the complaints, the NAO stated its purpose was, "to gather
information to assist the U.S. National Administrative Office to better
understand and publicly report on the Government of Mexico's promotion of
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, its labor law through appro-
priate government action."90
A. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America v.
Compafiia Armadora, S.A. (General Electric)
The UE alleged in its complaint that the Compafiia Armadora, a
subsidiary of General Electric in Juarez, Mexico, violated an extensive
number of labor laws,9 emphasizing a disregard for the right to orga-
nize.92 These alleged violations included violations of the Labor Principles
in Annex 1 of the NAALC, 93 various articles of the Mexican Constitu-
85. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution of industrial
relations disputes).
86. NAO Decides to Review, supra note 64, at D-14.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation; Notice of Determination
Regarding review of Submissions, #940001 and #940002, 59 Fed. Reg. No. 217 at 18, 832
(Apr. 15, 1994).
91. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 10.
92. NAO Decides to Review, supra note 64, at D-14.
93. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (listing the eleven Labor Principles addressed
in Annex 1 of the NAALC). The specific principles allegedly violated by Compaffia Armadora
were freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, minimum employment
standards, and prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses. Submission 2, supra note 24,
at 14.
9
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tion 94 and Mexican Federal labor laws.95  The complaint further alleged
violations of International Labour Organisation Conventions,96 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,97 and the United Nations Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights,98 and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.9
Although UE alleged that Compafifa Armadora violated several labor
laws and principles, the most prevalent allegations regarded freedom of
association and the right to organize." This is evidenced by assertions
that the company restricted workers from furthering their collective interests
by surveying union meetings, interfering with distribution of union leaflets,
and illegally discharging employees for union activity. 0'
The allegations were based primarily on a series of firings that took
place at the company."°2 The UE asserted that over 100 employees were
fired, at least twenty of whom were actively supporting a union organization
at the plant."°3 The UE believed that the termination of these twenty
employees was based solely on their union activity."°4 The union further
alleged that the GE subsidiary fired four employees following their appear-
ance in a photograph in a union newsletter.I05 These terminations occurred
within days of the newsletter's publication, shortly after the first union
organizational meeting.' 06 The firings commenced in November 1993, and
continued through early December of that year. 107
The UE noted that the employees were virtually forced to accept
severance pay following termination due to the economic hardships of the
94. Articles of the Mexican Constitution allegedly violated, which pertain to industrial
relations, include: article 6, which guarantees freedom of expression and the right to
information; article 7, which guarantees freedom of writing and publishing; and article 123,
which establishes Mexico's labor and social securities laws, including the right to organize. See
CONSTITUCION POLITICA [Constitution] arts. 6, 7 and 123 (Mex.), translated in [1995 Binder
XIII] 12 Const. Countries World (Oceana Pub. Inc.) (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1988) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONS].
95. Title Seven, ch. II, art. 357 of the Federal Labor Law of Mexico, allegedly violated,
grants workers and employers the right to establish unions without prior authorization. See
[1983 Binder 1], Com. Bus. & Trade L. Mexico, Louise Moreno, Mexico 11, 14 100 Labor
Law 105 (Oceana Pub., Inc.) (Michael W. Gordon ed., 1983).
96. International Labor Organization Conventions allegedly violated include: Conventions
87 on freedom of association, 98 and 170.
97. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
98. Done Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
99. Done Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
100. NAO Decides to Review, supra note 64.
101. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 10-12.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
104. NAO Decides to Review, supra note 64, at D-14.
105. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 6. The photograph appeared in the UE News
published November 9, 1993.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 6 and 9.
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region.108 Mexican law forbids workers from contesting terminations once
they accept severance pay.0 9 The UE complained directly to Compaffia
Armadora following the terminations of eleven of the employees." 0 The
company offered reinstatement to six employees who then chose severance
pay instead."' The company did not offer reinstatement to the others,
asserting that those terminations were justified under Mexican law for work
violations. iE
B. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Honeywell
The IBT asserted in its complaint that Honeywell's Chihuahua, Mexico
subsidiary committed abusive interrogations and fired union employees
without cause."' Furthermore, the company allegedly stated the reason for
termination was support of union organization." 4 Subsequently, Honeywell
pressured terminated employees to accept severance pay and relinquish their
right to claims for reinstatement. "5 Such allegations constitute violations
of article 123 of the Mexican Constitution"6 and the principles listed in the
NAALC's Annex ."'
The IBT's allegations are based on the termination of approximately
twenty factory employees in November, 1993."8 The IBT asserted that
nearly all of these employees supported joining an independent union. 119
Prior to their termination, the IBT claimed that the employees voiced a desire
to join STIMAHCS, 2 ° a union affiliated with the independent Mexican
labor federation, Frente Autentico Del Trabajo (F.A.T.).' 2' This labor
federation is neither affiliated with nor supported by the Mexican govern-
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 11 and 12. The laws regarding severance pay in Mexico are found in article
123, Section XXH of the Mexican Constitution and articles 47 of the Federal Labor Law of
Mexico.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id.
112. Position Statement of the General Electric Company, Submitted to the National
Administrative Office 2 (Aug. 17, 1994) [hereinafter GE Position].
113. Submission 1, supra note 25, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. See supra notes 94 and 110 and accompanying text (referring to article 123 of the
Mexican Constitution).
117. Submission 1, supra note 25, at 5. The complaint does not specifically list the Labor
Principles violated other than mentioning the right to join unions, which obviously refers to the
first principle "freedom of association and protection of the right to organize." The industrial
relations nature of this reference is sufficient for the focus of this discussion and inquiries as to
other principle violations, while meaningful, are beyond the scope of this comment.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Submission 1, supra note 25, at 2. STIMAHCS is a Mexican metal workers' union.
121. Id. Frente Autentico Del Trabajo is referred to in English as the Authentic Labor
Front.
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ment. 22  These employees, who were subsequently fired, were allegedly
held in offices and interrogated as to which employees were union support-
ers. 23  The IBT claimed the management told the workers the factory
would close before allowing a union such as STIMAHCS to organize.' 24
Furthermore, the employees interrogated were told they must sign resignation
forms in order to receive severance pay, thereby waiving any claims against
Honeywell. "
Honeywell asserted that it was merely downsizing operations due to
business conditions. 26  The company pointed out that the terminations
complied with Mexican law and the purpose for those terminations was
reducing the workforce and costs at the facility.2 7 Furthermore, all
employees discharged received full severance benefits and notice that they
would be eligible for rehiring if positions became available. 28  One
employee was rehired in May, 1994.129 The company did state, however,
that one employee was fired for repeated work rules violations. 3° The
management indicated that, despite warnings to cease, the employee con-
stantly left her work area and bothered other employees.1 31 She refused to
accept severance benefits and contested the termination before the Chihuahua
Labor Conciliation and Arbitration Board. 32  Although the employee
initially requested reinstatement, she later agreed to a settlement with the
company."' Honeywell states firmly that no employees were questioned
about union activity and that the management is supportive of any such
activity. "'
C. Attempts at Relief Under Mexican Law
According to the UE's complaint, of those former employees discharged
by General Electric, two did not accept severance pay and contested their
terminations. 35 Furthermore, the IBT's complaint indicated that one
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Honeywell's 1993 Downsizing Actions in Chihuahua: Comments on NAO Submission
#940001, Submitted to the National Administrative Office 1 (Aug. 31, 1994) [hereinafter
Honeywell Position].
127. Id. at 1, 3.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 5. This adjudicatory body, established by Mexican law, and its counterparts in
other jurisdictions review alleged labor law violations. See Crandall, supra note 2, at 177.
133. Honeywell Position, supra note 126, at 5.
134. Id. at 2 and 4.
135. GE Position, supra note 112, at 2 and 3.
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former Honeywell employee contested her termination before a Mexican
mediation and conciliation board.'36 Honeywell settled this claim with
compensation to the former employee rather than reinstatement.'17
Based on submissions from all parties, these three individuals' com-
plaints represent the extent of relief pursued under Mexican domestic
law. 3' General Electric Senior Counsel for Employment and Labor Law,
Arthur Joyce, indicated in a letter to the NAO on April 5, 1994, that the UE
had not pursued any relief through the Mexican legal system.'39
The UE stated in its complaint that the NAO should review the
allegations regardless of whether Mexican domestic relief had been
pursued. "4 This request was based on several grounds. First, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization's Committee of Experts issued an opinion in 1993,
stating that Mexico had repeatedly violated ILO Convention 87.141 Second,
the union cited a U.S. Congressional study of Mexican labor law enforce-
ment. 142  The study stated that the Mexican government and recognized
unions used their influence to deter the development of other unions. " 3
Third, the UE referenced opinions of various Mexican labor lawyers'4
that the Mexican government has a history of suppressing the right to
organize in Mexico.145 Finally, the union cited an article in U.S. News and
World Report showing the Mexican government's influence in preventing the
organization of independent labor unions. 4 6  Using these arguments, the
UE attempted to show that Mexico's lack of labor law enforcement would
make resorting to Mexican domestic remedies futile. The union asserted that
136. Submission 1, supra note 25, at 3. See also supra notes 130-133 and accompanying
text (discussing this employee's termination).
137. Honeywell Position, supra note 128, at 5. Following a March 28, 1994, Labor Board
meeting an approved agreement was made between the former employee and Honeywell
acknowledging that she was justifiably fired for work rules violations. Subsequently to this
acknowledgement she received severance compensation.
138. U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. National Administrative Office North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation Public Report of Review: NAO Submission #940001 and
NAO Submission #940002 (Oct. 12, 1994), at 26 and 27 [hereinafter NAO Report]. Available
through the NAO, see supra note 24; see also U.S. National Administrative Office's Public
Report of Review on Submissions No. 940001 and No. 940002, 197 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
197, at D-23.
139. Letter from Arthur E. Joyce, Senior Counsel Labor and Employment Law, General
Electric, to Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Acting Secretary, United States National Administrative
Office (April 5, 1994). On file with the California Western International Law Journal.
140. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 12.
141. Id. International Labor Organization Convention 87 deals with freedom of association
and protection of the right to organize. Mexico ratified this convention making it part of its
labor law.
142. Id. at 12, 13. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Mexico
Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart (1992).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Linda Robinson, Reaching to the South: Free Trade Alone Cannot Bring
Mexico and the United States Together, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 1, 1993, at 43).
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it was necessary for the NAO to review the allegations and Mexico's failure
to enforce its labor laws. 
147
The unions' allegations against the companies raised the first opportunity
to test the NAALC procedures for labor principle violations. 148  The
emphasis on freedom of association and the right to organize meant that
attention would focus on industrial relations. The more limited approach to
resolving these matters 49 placed a great deal of significance on the U.S.
NAO in this initial test of its review authority.
III. THE NAO's REVIEW AND REPORT
A. The Review
Pursuant to the Revised Notice of Establishment of U.S. National
Administrative Office and Procedural Guidelines,50 once the submissions
from the unions were accepted for review an inquiry and hearing were
planned. 5' The NAO stated that the issues raised were, "relevant to labor
law matters in Mexico and a review would further the objectives of the
NAALC.' ', 52  It elaborated that the review would focus on the alleged
violations of the principles of freedom of association and protection of the
right to organize as well as the prohibition on dismissing workers for
exercising those rights. 53
The purpose of the review was to understand and report on Mexico's
"promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, its labor law
through appropriate government action."' 54 By articulating this objective,
147. Id. at 12.
148. NAFTA Labor Protections Put to First Test as Mexican Workers Tell U.S. About
Firings, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept. 14, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA Labor Protections Put
to First Test].
149. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution of industrial
relations disputes).
150. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
151. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation; Notice of Determination
Regarding Review of Submissions #940001 and #940002, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,832 (1994). The
planned inquiry and hearing were in compliance with the NAO guidelines established in Revised
Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
152. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 8.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 8, 9. This standard of review is established in NAALC article 3, which states:
Each Party shall promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law
through appropriate government action, subject to Article 42, such as: (a) appointing
and training inspectors; (b) monitoring compliance and investigating suspected
violations, including through on-site inspections; (c) seeking assurances of voluntary
compliance; (d) requiring record keeping and reporting; (e) encouraging the establish-
ment of worker-management committees to address labor regulation of the workplace;
(f) providing or encouraging mediation, conciliation and arbitration services; or (g)
initiating, in a timely manner, proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies
for violations of its labor law.
14
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the NAO reiterated that its purpose was not to determine whether the two
companies violated Mexican labor laws, but rather, to understand and report
on the Mexican government's promotion and enforcement activities.,"
In conformity with the NAO guidelines, the NAO committed itself to
produce a public report summarizing its investigations findings and
recommendations. 56 Prior to the issuing of the report, the NAO conducted
its review by collecting information from a number of sources. Subsequent
to receiving the complaints from the two unions, and the position statements
from the two companies, the NAO began collecting additional informa-
tion. I5 7  The IBT and the UE submitted supplemental information in the
form of affidavits from workers affected by the alleged labor law viola-
tions. 158
The U.S. NAO also consulted with the Mexican NAO, as permitted
under NAALC article 21.159 The U.S. NAO requested from its Mexican
counterpart any public information on the complaints filed as well as
information on Mexican labor laws. Specifically, the NAO desired informa-
tion on Mexico's system of Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs). "
CABs enforce labor laws and settle disputes between labor and manage-
ment. '6 They have the authority to review matters related to freedom of
association and dismissal of workers. 62 The NAO requested statistics on
CABs' effectiveness in wrongful termination disputes.'63 These statistics
NAALC, supra note 1, art 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
155. NAO Closes Book on Union NAFTA Charges Against Honeywell and General Electric,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at D-3 (Oct. 14, 1994) [hereinafter NAO Closes Book].
156. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662. Section G.8 states, "within 120 days of
acceptance of a submission for review, unless circumstances require an extension of time of up
to 60 additional days, the Secretary shall issue a public report, which shall include a summary
of the proceedings and any findings and recommendations." Id.
157. Id. Section H. 1 at 16,662. These information collection activities include consultations
with other NAOs, the public hearing and any "further examination of the submission as may be
appropriate to assist the Office to better understand and publicly report on the issues raised."
158. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 9.
159. Id. at 12. See supra note 32 (discussing NAALC article 21).
160. Id.
161. CONSTITUCION POLITICA [Constitution], art. 123, § XX: "Differences or disputes
between capital and labor shall be subject to the decisions of a Conciliation and Arbitration
Board, consisting of an equal number of representatives of workers and employers, with one
(representative) from the government." Translation from CONSTITUTION, supra note 94, at 101.
162. NAO Report, supra note 138, app. II at A-10 and A-11.
163. Id. at 24, 25. A consultant's report regarding the period from June 1993, to June
1994, stated that the City of Chihuahua CAB (the Honeywell plant's jurisdiction) resolved all
but 173 of the 1,862 cases submitted during that period (91% resolved). During that same time
the CAB decided 650 cases that had been pending. The average time between filing of a
complaint and settlement is 7.3 months. This is significantly faster than many other state CABs
where the period is over a year. Id.
The Ciudad Juarez CAB (the Compafiia Armadora plant's jurisdiction) managed to achieve
an average adjudication period of 8 months despite having 1,249 complaints filed between the
period from January to May 1994. This CAB lacks the personnel to offer conciliation
proceedings, but still managed to settle 1,050 of the complaints (84% resolved). Id. at 25.
The information on CABs generally stated that they were effective in handling cases
15
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would indicate wrongful termination actions settled with reinstatement
compared to those settled with severance." 6  Finally, the Mexican NAO
provided information on the severance pay system and its role in place of
reinstatement proceedings under the CAB system.65
The NAO next held a public hearing,' 66 as required by procedural
guidelines,' 67 to obtain information related to the allegations. Prior to the
hearing's commencement, statements were made by GE, Honeywell, the
U.S. Council for International Business and Ms. Barbara Eastman of the
United Auto Workers. 68
The company statements reiterated much of their earlier correspondence
with the NAO. GE emphasized that there was no evidence the Mexican
government had displayed a pattern of non-enforcement of its labor laws
related to freedom of association and the right to organize. 169 Honeywell
again explained its reduction in personnel and reiterated that there was a lack
of evidence supporting the allegation that the Mexican government was not
enforcing its labor laws.' 70
To support the companies' arguments the U.S. Council for International
Business argued that the NAO should not have reviewed the complaints
because they focused on companies rather than Parties to the NAALC. 17'
It further argued that when the unions filed the complaints, the disputes had
either been resolved or the proper Mexican domestic legal procedures for
relief had not been pursued. 72  This point emphasized the inappropriate-
ness of the decision to review the matters. Finally, Ms. Eastman's pre-
hearing statement discussed her visit to the Compafiia Armadora plant, where
she witnessed management interfering with the distribution of union literature
in and outside of the plant. '
The actual hearing consisted of four panels of testimony in Washington
D.C. 17' From the outset of the hearing, NAO Secretary Irasema Garza
emphasized that "the hearing was being conducted to gather information to
assist the NAO in preparing its public report, that the purpose of the hearing
was not to adjudicate individual rights, and that it was not an adversarial
effectively. One report did indicate that these boards were more unbiased and impartial on
matters regarding individual rights as opposed to those regarding collective matters. Id.
164. Id. at 12, 13.
165. Id. at 13.
166. The NAO public hearing regarding Submissions #940001 and #940002 were held in
Washington, D.C. on September 12, 1994. Id. at 13, 14.
167. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
168. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 14.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 15.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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proceeding." 1 75
The first panel consisted of two union representatives, one from the UE
and the other from the IBT.176 Each addressed the allegations and demand-
ed that these labor principle violations cease.' 77  Mr. Ron Carey also
voiced the IBT's dissatisfaction with the extent of information the NAO
received from the Mexican government and the companies in question.' 7 1
He also complained that the hearing was not held in a location more
convenient for the Mexican testifiers 179 and that cameras should have been
permitted in the hearing."0 Finally, he argued that the hearing should have
allowed testimony regarding union elections held on August 24, 1994, at the
Compafiia Armadora plant.' 8 '
The second panel consisted of testimony from another UE representative,
a former employee of Compafiia Armadora, a former employee of Honeywell
and a STIMAHCS representative.8 2 The UE representative summarized
the allegations.' 83 The workers testified as to their experiences and that
they had not contacted government officials regarding their health and safety
concerns in the factories.l'4 This indicates that Mexican laborers, at least
in these factories, believed they were unable to make effective use of their
domestic outlets for labor concerns. Finally, the STIMAHCS representative,
Mr. Benedicto Martinez, testified as to the difficulty of establishing
independent unions in Mexico.' 5 He claimed that this difficulty was due
to official union domination and company tactics used to prevent protests and
hamper union organization plans.'86 These tactics include delaying the
processing of CAB hearing complaints to induce financial hardship. I 7
This, in turn, forces acceptance of severance compensation. Another tactic
is mandatory signing of "blank sheets" by employees, which the employer
may later fill in as the employee's resignation. 8
175. Id.
176. Id. The panel members were Mr. Ron Carey, General President of the IBT and Ms.
Amy Newell, General Secretary-Treasurer of the UE.
177. NAFTA Labor Protections Put to First Test, supra note 148.
178. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 16.
179. NAFTA Labor Protections Put to First Test, supra note 148.
180. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 16,
181. Id. These elections were the subject of another complaint submitted to the NAO by
the UE on September 12, 1994. See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
182. Id. The panel members were Ms. Robin Alexander of the UE; Mr. Fernando Castro
Herndndez, formerly of Compafia Armadora; Ms. Ofelia Medrano, formerly of Honeywell; and
Mr. Benedicto Martinez of STIMAHCS.
183. Id. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the UE allegations
against Compafiia Armadora).
184. Id. at 16, 17.
185. Id. at 17, 18.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 17.
188. Id.
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The third panel was comprised of four Mexican labor lawyers. 189
They testified as to the content and enforcement of Mexican labor laws."9
They elaborated on the government and company tactics used to prevent
organization of independent unions at the maquiladoras.'9' These tactics
included difficult union registration procedures, complex approval require-
ments to strike, and "black lists" of union-supporting employees.' 92
Finally, the fourth panel consisted of three IBT lawyers and a repre-
sentative from the Ontario Federation of Labor.' 93 The Canadian represen-
tative described Canadian labor law in Ontario in order to provide the benefit
of a comparative perspective.' 94 The IBT representatives all gave recom-
mendations regarding the hearings. Ms. Judy Scott's suggestions ranged
from forced reinstatement of the workers to the establishment of a code of
conduct for maquiladoras.' 95 Ms. Scott also recommended consultations
among the NAOs to develop cooperative activities on industrial relations
matters and joint conferences for labor and management. 96 She further
suggested the publication of a "plain language" guide to labor and manage-
ment rights for widespread distribution and increased awareness. 97 Mr.
Earl Brown testified that in the future, companies involved with submissions
should be required to participate in the hearing.' Mr. Thomas Geoghegan
recommended that ministerial consultations be implemented because the
Mexican severance pay system discourages the use of CABs, and because the
inability of workers to organize prevents them from protecting themselves
from health and safety violations.' 99
Honeywell and GE both chose not to participate in the hearing.' ° The
companies referred to the unions' allegations as "another effort to undermine
NAFTA. "2°t Organized labor's long-standing opposition to NAFTA °2
189. Id. at 18. The panel members were Mr. Arturo Alcalde, Mr. Jestis Campos, Mr.
Jorge Fernandez and Mr. Gustavo de la Rosa.
190. Id. at 18, 19.
191. Id. Maquiladoras are Mexican factories, often owned by U.S. parent companies, that
enjoy the benefit of a reduced import tariff to the U.S. based solely on the value added to the
product at the maquiladora rather than its full value. See Michael Connor, Maquiladoras and
the Border Environment: Prospects for Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 683, 683-86 (1992).
192. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 18-19.
193. Id. at 19. The panel members were Ms. Judy Scott, Mr. Earl Brown, and Mr.
Thomas Geoghegan, all representing the IBT, and Mr. Chris Schenck of the Ontario Federation
of Labor.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 20.
200. NAFTA Labor Protections Put to Test as Mexican Workers Testify Before NAO, supra
note 23, at 1391.
201. Id.
[Vol. 25
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1995], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss2/6
1995] NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION 443
may lend credence to this statement. It is, therefore, plausible for the
companies to argue that these allegations were nothing more than union
efforts to publicly increase anti-NAFTA sentiment."0 3
The IBT, the UE, and Honeywell all made post-hearing statements. 2°4
The IBT statement responded to the companies' interpretations of NAALC
guidelines for NAO review and recommendations, rebutting their assertion
that the NAO lacked authority to review these matters205 The statement
also pointed out key facts from the hearing, emphasized that greater weight
should be placed on oral testimony than on the written company statements,
and emphasized the significance of the comparison to U.S. and Canadian
labor law. 206
The UE's statement reiterated the allegations that the Mexican govern-
ment had failed to protect organizational and associational rights.2 7 It also
noted the specific wrongful actions of the two companies and addressed the
unfair severance system which denied workers access to the legal system. 0 8
The UE also requested that the NAO report reaffirm the importance of the
freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, as well as all
other labor laws.2 9 More specifically, the UE requested that the compa-
nies be required to take corrective actions, that the governments participate
in cooperative activities, and a summary of Mexican workers rights be
prepared.1 °
Finally, Honeywell again argued that it violated no Mexican laws. 21
It reiterated that the one employee terminated for work violations subsequent-
ly came to a CAB-approved settlement agreement.212 Honeywell stated that
the former employee's attorney, not the company, suggested the settle-
ment.2"3 In conclusion, the company stated that because no Mexican labor
law was violated and no complaints remained unresolved, there was no basis
to conclude that the Mexican government failed to enforce its labor laws. 2 '14
In addition to the submissions, the NAO consultations and the hearing,
the NAO obtained information from Mexican labor law experts and other
202. Katherine A. Hagen, Fundamentals of Labor Issues and NAFTA, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 917, 918 (1994)
203. GE Position, supra note 112, at 5 and Honeywell Position, supra note 126, at 6.
204. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 20-22.
205. Id. at 20.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 20-21.
209. Id. at21.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text (discussing the Honeywell employee
fired for repeated work rules violations).
213. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 21.
214. Id. at 21-22.
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printed sources. 215  These sources included, among others, government
reports and law review journals. 216  The NAO then prepared the final
report presenting its findings and recommendations.217
B. The Report
The NAO issued its final report on October 12, 1994.218 In addition
to a background of the review, the report stated the U.S. NAO's conclusions
and recommendations regarding the complaints.21 9 The NAO stated that
based on the evidence available, it did not find "that the Government of
Mexico failed to promote compliance with or enforce," the labor laws at
issue.220
The report reiterated several points before stating its findings. First, it
stressed that the review focused on the labor laws related to the freedom of
association and the right to organize as well as the prohibition of dismissal
of workers for the exercise of those rights. 2 ' Second, the NAO empha-
sized that the review focused on the actions of the Mexican government and
not the specific actions of the companies accused of labor law violations. 2
Finally, the report addressed its role in the dispute by pointing out that the
NAO is not an appellate body, nor a substitute for Mexican domestic
remedies. 22
The NAO found that the workers acceptance of severance pay precluded
Mexican authorities from determining if the terminations were wrongful. 24
This prevented a conclusion that Mexico failed to promote or enforce its
relevant labor laws. 225  Even in cases where the companies admitted
making mistakes, the workers offered reinstatement chose a larger severance
pay instead. 226  The few workers who did not accept severance pay and
challenged their dismissals availed themselves of Mexican law and awaited
215. Id. at 13. The NAO presented a series of questions to two sets of U.S. experts on
Mexican labor law. The questionnaires inquired specifically on the topics of enforcement of
labor laws and the role of the CABs. Id.
216. Id. at 22. A sample listing of these sources include: A Primer on Mexican Labor
Law, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs (1991); Ann M. Bartow,
The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 11 COMP. LAB. L. (1990); and Mark Zelek & Oscar de la
Vega, An Outline of Mexican Labor Law, 43 LAB. L.J. 466 (1992).
217. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16662.
218. NAO Report, supra note 138.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 32.
221. Id. at 28.
222. Id. See also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing that a complaint
filed with an NAO must allege inappropriate activity by a Party to the NAALC).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 30. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
225. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 30.
226. Id. at 30, 31. See also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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the judgment pending.227 The report also pointed out that neither complaint
alleged that the settlements arranged and approved by the respective CABs
were the result of any improprieties.228
On the other hand, the NAO did note a concern that workers appeared
to have a perception that legal remedies would not be successful.229 There
was also the frequent concern that financial hardship in the region and lack
of unemployment insurance programs encouraged settlements .23°  This
could arguably be interpreted as a realization that the Mexican workers' right
to organize is limited by the economic hardship of the region.23' This does
not, however, preclude the fact that the workers were aware of their legal
right to challenge their dismissal, but chose settlement instead.232 The
NAO also acknowledged that the timing of the dismissals appeared to
coincide with independent union organizing drives at the factories.233
Based on the conclusion that the Mexican government did not fail to
promote compliance with or enforcement of its labor laws, the NAO report
announced that it would not recommend the ministerial consultations
permitted under article 22 of the NAALC. 234  The NAO did voice a
number of concerns and made several recommendations pursuant to article
11 of the NAALC.235
The report showed a concern for enforcement of labor laws regarding
the establishing of recognized unions in Mexico. 236 Related to this was the
issue of company policies against union-supporting workers and the pref-
erential treatment granted to official government supported unions .237 The
report noted that there was a lack of practical knowledge among the Parties
to the NAALC regarding each countries' industrial relations labor laws.238
In response to these concerns the NAO made several recommenda-
tions .239 First, it recommended that the countries develop and participate
in cooperative programs regarding the freedom of association and the right
227. Id. at 31. See also supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 26-28.
229. Id. at 30.
230. Id. at 29, 30.
231. Id. at 30.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 32. See also Allen R. Myerson, U.S. Backs Mexico Law, Vexing Labor, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at D-1. For a discussion of article 22 of the NAALC see supra notes
36 & 37 and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 32. Article 11 of the NAALC establishes that the Council shall promote
cooperative activities between the Parties regarding various labor matters. NAALC, supra note
1, art. 11, 32 I.L.M. at 1505-06.
236. Id. at 29.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 31.
239. See, e.g., U.S. Backs Mexico Law, Vexing Labor, supra note 234, at D-1.
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to organize. 240 An example given was a "government-to-government
trinational seminar," with participation from state and/or provincial labor
authorities. 24' This would ideally be followed by related local events.242
These recommendations spotlight the ability of the NAO to urge the
evolution and progress of labor law policy and enforcement.
The report also concluded that public awareness of the NAALC was
lacking.243 It recommended that each country commence a public informa-
tion program. 24 Examples of such activities include conferences for
worker and employer organizations regarding the NAALC. Also, con-
ferences for individual employers and workers could be pursued. 245
Furthermore, the Secretariat,246 once established,247 should prepare infor-
mational materials for widespread distribution. 248
These cooperative programs represent the extent of activities recom-
mended as a result of the review by the NAO. Although ministerial
consultations were the only dispute resolution procedures available to these
industrial relations matters,2 49 the NAO deemed them inappropriate.25
The result of these findings and recommendations bring a new opportunity
for criticism and analysis.
IV. THE NAO REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT
A. The Appropriateness of the Review
An appropriate point to begin looking at the NAO review is whether it
should have been conducted at all. Although the unions involved believed
a review was in accordance with the NAALC, from the moment the NAO
announced its plans to review the unions' allegations the corporations
questioned whether the NAO had such authority. 21
GE argued in its position statement to the NAO that the only allegation
240. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 31.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 32.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See supra note 20 (discussing the four major bodies of the Commission established by
the NAALC).
247. John McKennirey, the Canadian selected as Executive Director, is currently
establishing the Secretariat in Dallas, Texas. See, e.g., Canadian Named to Head NAFTA-
Related Panel, Daily Lab Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at D-28 (March 1, 1995).
248. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 32. The report does not elaborate on what is meant
by the term "widespread" other than to say that the distribution should take place in all three
countries that are Parties to the agreement.
249. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on resolution
of industrial relations matters).
250. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 32.
251. NAO Decides to Review, supra note 64, at D-14.
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raised in the UE's complaint that the NAO was authorized to review was
whether there was a pattern of nonenforcement by the Mexican government
of its industrial relations labor laws. 52 The company then elaborated that
all post-dismissal activities by the parties were settled or were following
Mexican domestic procedures. 3 Thus, GE stated that there could be no
showing of nonenforcement of applicable labor laws by the Mexican
government 54 This argument coincided with the conclusion of the NAO's
report. 55
One critic argues that the standard for determining whether a review is
appropriate is too broad.6 The standard merely asks whether the com-
plaint raises labor law issues in the territory of another Party and if a review
would further the objectives of the NAALC. 57 It would arguably be more
appropriate to set a standard that more effectively eliminates the complaints
lacking legal substance, regardless of the sympathy they evoke.5
GE's position statement raised several other points of controversy
regarding the NAO decision to review." First, the statement pointed out
that all employee dismissals by Compafifa Armadora addressed in the UE
submission, occurred prior to the effective date of the NAALC.2 6 Article
49 of the NAALC states that a "pattern of practice means a course of action
or inaction beginning after the date of entry into force of the Agree-
ment."261 Relying on this text, GE argued that the timing of the dismissals
prevented an NAO review.262
Although this appeared to be a strong argument, the NAO refuted it
early in its final report.263 First, the NAO stated that several of the
dismissed employees pursued their reinstatement into 1994.61 More
significantly, the report indicated that the date or an event is only relevant to
determine a "pattern of practice," which is necessary to establish an
ECE. 265  Therefore, GE's argument that the timing of the dismissals
prevented a review was not valid.
252. GE Position, supra note 112, at 1.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 224-228 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of the NAO).
256. Marshall J. Breger, Hitting Mexican Industry with NAFTA Rules, THE RECORDER,
Nov. 23, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter Hitting Mexican Industry].
257. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the NAO standard of review).
258. Hitting Mexican Industry, supra note 256, at 6.
259. GE Position, supra note 112, at 3 and 4.
260. Id. at 3. The NAALC went into effect, as mandated by article 51, on January 1,
1994. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 51, 32 I.L.M. at 1514. See, e.g., supra notes 102-107 and
accompanying text (discussing the dismissals of the employees at the GE plant).
261. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14.
262. GE Position, supra note 112, at 4, 32 I.L.M. at 1513-1514.
263. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 8.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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GE's argument may have warranted greater consideration. Although the
"pattern of practice" issue did not apply (because no ECE was needed), only
two former employees of Compafifa Armadora had not settled their dispute
with the factory. 26  Furthermore, these two former employees continued
to fight for reinstatement by pursuing domestic remedies at the time the com-
plaint was submitted to the NAO. 267  As such, the employees had not yet
exhausted domestic remedies available. All other aspects of the dismissals,
which occurred prior to the NAALC's effective date were settled before the
NAO's decision to review. 268  All of these facts were stated in the UE's
complaint.269  Relying on this information alone, supplied by the com-
plainant, it appears that a full investigative review was unnecessary. GE's
first argument (that there was no valid allegation of government nonen-
forcement of labor laws), which coincided with the NAO's final decision,
supports its second argument, that the timing of the events made the review
inappropriate.27
Next, in its position statement GE argued that the UE failed to pursue
domestic remedies for the allegations in the complaint. 27' The UE com-
plaint offered support as to why pursuit of domestic relief would be
futile,272 but gave no evidence of its attempts to confirm that futility. The
pursuit of a domestic remedy is a consideration of such significance that the
U.S. NAO made it an issue that must be addressed in any complaint
filed.273
This argument, that a domestic remedy was not pursued by the unions
was supported by the Industrial Relations Committee of the U.S. Council for
International Business.274 This organization sent a statement to the NAO,
endorsed by the international labor affairs group of the National Association
of Manufacturers,275 stating its position on the NAO's review of the
unions' submissions.276 In the statement, Edward Potter of the Council
stated that acceptance for review of these submissions, "effectively rendered
266. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 10.
267. Id. at 6 and 10.
268. The NAO announced its decision to review the submissions on April 20, 1994. Each
submission was filed by its respective union on February 14, 1994. See, NAFTA Labor
Protections Put to Test as Mexican Workers Testify Before NAO, supra note 23, at 1391.
269. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 5-10.
270. For GE's first two arguments see supra notes 252-255 and 260-262 and accompanying
texts.
271. GE Position, supra note 112, at 4.
272. Submission 2, supra note 24, at 12 and 13. For a discussion of these arguments
against the pursuit of domestic remedies. See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
273. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,661.
274. Letter from Mr. Edward E. Potter, International Labor Counsel, U.S. Council for
International Business, to Ms. Irasema T. Garza, Secretary, NAO Bureau of International Labor
Affairs 3-5 (Aug. 31, 1994) on file with California Western International Law Journal).
275. Id. at 1.
276. Id.
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meaningless," the submission criteria established by the NAO.277
It is difficult to establish that a government did not promote compliance
with or enforcement of its laws when was not given the opportunity to do so.
Those individuals who had not settled with the companies were pursuing
domestic remedies.27 No first hand allegations of impropriety on the part
of the Mexican authorities were made.279 The unions possibly recognized
the opportunity to bring greater awareness of the incidents at the two plants
by means of an NAO review, rather than through the more appropriate
Mexican domestic review.28° The question remains, however, whether an
impression of ineffectiveness and an opportunity for public awareness of
labor issues warrants ignoring Mexican CAB proceedings for an NAALC
proceeding.
GE argued that the UE submission was an attempt to use the NAO to
review the actions of corporations, which is not permitted under the
NAALC.28' In support of this argument, the company pointed to UE
requests that the NAO "make findings of fact and credibility determi-
nations. ' 28 2 Furthermore, GE stated that the complaint inappropriately re-
quested that Compaiia Armadora be instructed to take specific actions.283
These requests did not fit into the NAALC mandated-guideline that Parties
to the agreement shall not undertake labor law enforcement activities in
another Party's territory. 2' The issue must be whether the Mexican
government has failed to promote compliance with or enforcement of its
applicable labor laws.
This argument, although meritorious, fails to consider that not promoting
compliance could be construed as an allegation against the government.
After all, one of the objectives agreed to by the three countries was to, "pro-
mote, to the maximum extent possible, the labor principles," set forth in the
agreement.285 So long as the complaint made allegations against the
government and all NAO submission criteria were met,286 the NAO could
merely disregard requests for relief that it was not empowered to address.
Honeywell's position statement did not directly challenge the NAO
review authority as did GE's.287 Rather, it chose to stand firmly by its
277. Id. at 3.
278. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
279. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 26 and 27.
280. GE Position, supra note 112, at 5.
281. Id. at4.
282. Id. at 5.
283. Id. For a listing of the requested actions see Submission 2, supra note 24, at 15, 16.
284. Id. This guideline is established in article 42 of the NAALC. NAALC, supra note
1, art. 42, 32 I.L.M. at 1513.
285. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
286. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing criteria for filing a
submission with the U.S. NAO).
287. See generally Honeywell Position, supra note 126.
25
Bazar: Is the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Working for
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
450 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
argument that it violated no Mexican labor laws and that there was no
instance of non-enforcement by the Mexican government .218 The facts and
circumstances, however, regarding timing of dismissals, timing of settle-
ments, domestic relief pursued and relief requested by the IBT, all permit the
application of GE's arguments to the IBT submission against Honeywell.289
All of these arguments warranted some consideration, but the NAO
chose to accept the submissions filed by the unions. 2 ° The fact that the
review produced no strikingly different conclusions may be further evidence
that it was inappropriate or unnecessary.
B. The Review and its Impact
The conclusions of the NAO drew applause and criticism of the
reviewing body's methods, all of which raised issues as to the NAO's effec-
tiveness in this review process.2 9' Honeywell's Glen Scovholt stated,
"We're pleased that the NAO's six-month inquiry vindicates
Honeywell. ' 292  GE simply stated that the issue was, "not a company-
specific matter," referring to its position statement sent to the NAO.293
The unions' comments were more critical. Amy Newell of the UE, who
testified294 at the NAO hearing, stated, "[t]he NAO report confirms what
labor has maintained all along, that the NAFTA side agreements were
toothless and ineffective."295  She added, "[w]orkers' rights are trampled
by U.S. corporations like GE and Honeywell, protected by the lack of any
action on the part of the government."
296
Criticism of the decision came from outside sources as well. The
director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s task force on trade said, "[w]e're quite
disappointed. The Administration has decided against making the most of
even a limited labor accord."2 97
Criticism could arguably arise from NAO procedures or the NAALC
itself. As discussed previously, the NAO of each country establishes its own
procedural guidelines for review of labor law matters arising in another
Party's territory. 298  This is mandated by article 16 of the NAALC.2 99
288. Id. at 6.
289. For the general facts regarding the IBT submission see supra part n.B.
290. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
291. NAO Closes Book on Union NAFTA Charges Against Honeywell and General Electric,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D3 (Oct. 14, 1994) [hereinafter NAO Closes Book].
292. Richard Alm, Union Leaders Upset After Labor Complaints on Mexico Shunned,
Dallas Morning News, Oct. 14, 1994, at 1-D [hereinafter Union Leaders Upset].
293. NAO Closes Book, supra note 291.
294. See, e.g., supra notes 176-181 and accompanying text (discussing the first panel of
testimony at the September 12, 1994, NAO hearing).
295. Union Leaders Upset, supra note 292.
296. Id.
297. U.S. Backs Mexico Law, Vexing Labor, supra note 234.
298. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
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The rationale that this allows each country to make its guidelines comply
with domestic procedure is significant because it emphasizes the priority of
each country's domestic law.3" However, independence in reviewing
matters could lead to inconsistency among the various NAOs. The NAALC
establishes the broad framework requiring the matter to concern labor law
matters in another territory. 1 Beyond this, however, each NAO has
considerable discretion. For example, the U.S. standard requires that the
matter arise in another territory and that "a review would further the
objectives of the Agreement. "302
This degree of discretion has both positive and negative aspects. When
dealing with concerns of labor law violations in another Party country, this
discretion allows greater opportunity for review. Such discretion, however,
may encourage the review of meritless matters. Also consider the time
involved in the review of the submissions filed by the unions on February
14, 1994. 303 The final NAO report was not issued until October 12,
1994.304  After eight months the report established that there was no
government enforcement violation. Yet the NAO could have made this
determination based on little more than the facts in the complaints. °5
Conducting the review was not necessarily wrong, but the NAO might have
saved time and resources if there were stricter guidelines as to what warrants
a review.
In addition to determining what matters to review, the NAO also
301 riiestablishes the guidelines by which it conducts its review. Unions criti
cized the NAO's examination of the matter as not extensive enough.3 7
Specifically, the unions asserted that more information should have been
obtained from the Mexican government and the companies involved.3 8
The guidelines call for an examination of all information that is relevant
to the matter and will assist with the duty to publicly report.3 9  This
includes any publicly available information from the NAO of the government
Party in question. 310 The guidelines also call for a hearing to be conduct-
ed.311 The U.S. NAO guidelines do not limit the investigation methods
299. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing this article of the NAALC).
300. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
301. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
302. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16661.
303. NAFTA Labor Protections Put To Test as Mexican Workers Testify Before the NAO,
supra note 23, at 1391.
304. NAO Report, supra note 138.
305. See, e.g., supra notes 267-269 and accompanying text.
306. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
307. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 16.
308. Id.
309. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
310. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507.
311. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,662.
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that may be used.312 Furthermore, the report issued by the NAO discussed
extensively the submissions filed, the Mexican NAO's support of the inves-
tigation, and the hearing and expert testimony.3"3 The NAO appears to
have complied with its self-established guideline of obtaining information,
and was able to effectively report on the matter. As such, it is questionable
whether alternative methods would have provided additional useful informa-
tion.
A significant flaw in the NAO review was rooted in the unions'
submissions themselves. As noted by GE in its position statement, the
complaints focused extensively on the actions of the companies.314 In fact,
the relief requested largely focused on actions demanded of the compa-
nies.31 Although this inappropriate focus would not necessarily prevent
a review,"' the more appropriate focus on the Mexican government's
activities might have benefitted the unions' goals. Had the allegations cen-
tered on the Mexican governments's lack of promotion of compliance with
or enforcement of its labor laws, the unions might have had a stronger case
for the dismissed workers. On the other hand, this more appropriate focus
might have alerted the unions that their case against the government was
unwarranted or inappropriate based on the circumstances.317
C. Effectiveness of the NAO
The NAALC as a whole may also be criticized. The industrial relations
matters raised in the submissions would, at best, only receive the benefit of
ministerial consultations." 8 Why should the technical labor principle
violations receive the benefit of extensive dispute resolution procedures, 19
while the review of industrial relations principle violations remains so
limited?
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that the reason for
limiting the means of resolution of these matters was to avoid interference in
labor/management negotiations."32 Furthermore, both Mexico and Canada
opposed the imposition of sanctions for labor principle violations during the
312. See generally id. at 16,662.
313. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 9-22.
314. GE Position, supra note 112, at 4 n.25.
315. Submission 1, supra note 25, at 5, 6; Submission 2, supra note 24, at 15, 16.
316. See, e.g., supra notes 283-284 and accompanying text (discussing this GE argument).
317. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 32 and also see, e.g., supra notes 253-254 and
accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 31-63 and accompanying text (discussing the dispute resolution
procedures the NAALC establishes for technical labor matters).
320. Crandall, supra note 2, at 186-87.
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NAALC negotiations.3 2 However, mere public exposure of labor principle
violations may encourage the Mexican government to respond to and remedy
the problem.3"
Critics of the limited options for resolving industrial relations matters
regard the accord as weak and the result of corporate pressure on the
government negotiators. 323  Jerome Levinson, formerly of the Inter-
American Bank, "[by] not addressing the labor relations issue, the United
States is, in effect, sanctioning a system in which abuses are endemic. ' 324
Regarding the limited resolution procedures for industrial relations matters
he later added, "[t]he U.S. side is satisfied with a cosmetic solution. ' 321
The criticism of the NAALC's limited resolution procedures on these
matters is highly debated. However, in the case of the UE and the IBT
submissions it is not an effective argument. Based on the findings of the
NAO, the fact that the matters regarding the workers' right to organize could
not go beyond ministerial consultations is irrelevant. The NAO did not even
deem the consultations necessary, precluding an argument, at least in this
case, that the NAALC is ineffective in the resolution of these matters.
An alternative criticism may be the result of what could be considered
NAO's "politically friendly" decision. Mexico's sensitivity to impositions
on its sovereignty could have influenced the conclusions of the review.326
The Mexican concern regarding infringement on its sovereignty dates back
to the negotiations for the NAALC.327  During negotiations for the
NAALC, one critic warned President Clinton that pushing for enforcement
sanctions threatened Mexican sovereignty and jeopardized the prospects for
NAFTA as a whole.3 2  The timing of the review may also have been too
early in the life of NAFTA, as well as the NAALC, to start pushing
governments for changes in policies.3 29 Conversely, a strong stand in the
321. NAFTA Threat: Clinton Should Drop Idea of Enforcement Sanctions, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 5, 1993, at A-28.
322. Jerome I. Levinson, The Labor Side Accord to the North American Free Trade
Agreement: An Endorsement of Abuse of Worker Rights in Mexico, ECON. POL'Y INST.
BRIEFING PAPER (Economic Policy Institute, Washington D.C.) Sept. 1993, at 11.
323. Union Leaders Upset, supra note 292.
324. Jerome I. Levinson, Give Mexican Workers Their Due: U.S. Firms are Already
Taking Advantage of Poor Labor Protections; the Treaty Must be Amended to Prevent Further
Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at B-7.
325. Levinson, supra note 322, at 11.
326. Union Leaders Upset, supra note 292.
327. Benjamin Rozwood and Andrew R. Walker, Comment, Side Agreements, Sidesteps,
and Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free Trade in North America, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333,
335 (1993).
328. NAFTA Threat: Clinton Should Drop Idea of Enforcement Sanctions, supra note 321,
at A-28.
329. After losing the battle over NAFTA, U.S. organized labor turned to the NAALC as
its source of defending member's jobs. Hitting Mexican Industry, supra note 256, at 6.
Allowing the unions' public outcries and influence to persuade the NAO's findings could have
been a politically disastrous decision. This is especially a concern when many Mexican officials
believe the NAALC was nothing more than a U.S. social agenda inappropriately forced on them
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initially might have been an effective means of gaining credibility for the
NAALC.
Have organized labor's fears been realized? Is the NAALC merely
"cosmetic?" During the NAFTA debates the U.S. public's main concern
was the loss of jobs of U.S. workers.330 This concern is not relevant here,
but the fear of continued repression of Mexican workers' rights was clearly
raised. One NAO review is insufficient evidence to judge the effectiveness
of the process.
The NAO review established a number of significant accomplishments.
First, recognizing the lack of awareness regarding the NAALC, recommen-
dations were made to implement programs promoting awareness of the
agreement throughout all three countries."' Probably even more sig-
nificant to the unions was the NAO recommendation that the Parties establish
cooperative programs encouraging awareness of the rights encompassed by
the industrial relations label.33 These recommendations, although probably
not the unions' ideal decision, surely represent a step in the direction of
progress. These cooperative programs embody the spirit of the NAALC.
They will be the means by which the Parties can amicably, "promote, to the
maximum extent possible, the labor principles and improve working condi-
tions and living standards in each Party's territory."333
V. THE FUTURE
In the aftermath of the initial hearing, the NAO faced two new disputes.
Each alleged labor law violations in Mexico, but one was a follow-up action
by the UE against GE.334 Each stands to play a significant part in refining
the role of the NAO, now that the initial review is complete. These subse-
quent reviews will likely be subject to greater scrutiny.
The UE complaint335 did not become the second test of the NAO's
review procedures. The union withdrew the submission stating that the
during trade negotiations. See NAFTA Can't Force Mexico to Improve, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb.
25, 1995, at B7.
330. Hagen, supra note 202, at 919.
331. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 32.
332. Id. at 31.
333. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1503. This quotation encompasses only
two of the objectives of the agreement listed in this article (objectives a and b). In one respect
or another all of the objectives are supported by these cooperative programs.
334. Labor Department to Review UE Charges of Violations by GE at Mexican Plant, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-8 (Nov. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Labor Department to Review].
335. This complaint, submitted by the UE, National Administrative Office, Submission,
#940004, September 12, 1994 [hereinafter Submission 41 was accepted for review by the NAO
on November 4, 1994. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation; Notice of
Determination Regarding Review of Submission #940004, 59 Fed. Reg., at 56,094 (Nov. 10,
1994).
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ineffectiveness of the first review made subsequent attempts not worth-
while.336 The complaint alleged fraudulent action by GE in a secret ballot
election for representation by the independent metalworkers' union,
STIMAHCS, at the Compafhia Armadora plant.33 The workers voted
against representation, but the UE, who represents many of the Mexican
workers' U.S. counterparts, alleges the company manipulated the results.338
Claiming a hearing would not provide a "full and fair consideration," of
the charges the UE decided it would not make use of NAALC proce-
dures.3 39  Irasema Garza, Secretary of the NAO, responded with an
assertion that the union apparently misunderstood the role and authority of
the NAO.3 She pointed out that the NAALC only provides authority to
ensure that each Party enforces their own domestic labor laws.
34
'
The other submission342 was brought by four U.S. and Mexican human
rights organizations alleging labor law violations by the Sony Corporation
and the Mexican government.3 43 In the extensive and detailed submission,
the complainants alleged work hours violations as well as infringements on
the right to organize and the freedom of association. 3" In deciding to
review these allegations, the NAO, apparently looking back to the first
hearing, determined that the work hours allegations had not been pursued
sufficiently through Mexican domestic law to warrant review.345 In its
announcement, the office agreed to review the industrial relations allegations
and stated that the work hours matter would be open for reconsideration
provided further evidence is supplied that domestic remedies were
sought. 46
336. NAFTA: Electrical Workers Drop Petition; Lambastes NAO for "White Wash" Probe,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at D-14 (Feb. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Electrical Workers Drop
Petition].
337. Labor Department to Review, supra note 334, at D-8. In this election, possibly the
first secret ballot union election in Mexican labor history, the workers voted 914 to 159 against
STIMAHCS representation. Id.
338. Id.
339. Electrical Workers Drop Petition, supra note 336, at D-14.
340. Id.
341. Id. See also NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1503 which states: "The
objectives of this Agreement are to: .. .(f) promote compliance with, and effective enforcement
by each Party of, its labor law."
342. National Administrative Office, Submission #940003, Aug. 16, 1994 [hereinafter
Submission 31. This complaint was submitted to the NAO by the International Labor Rights
Education and Research Fund, the Asociaci6n Nacional de Abogados Democraticos (the Mexican
National Association of Democratic Lawyers), the American Friends Service Committee and the
Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras. See North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation; Notice of Determination Regarding Review of Submission #940003, 59 Fed. Reg.,
at 52,992 (Oct. 20, 1994).
343. Sony, Mexican Government Charged With NAFTA Labor Law Violations, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 34, at 1307 (Aug. 24, 1994).
344. Submission #3, supra note 342, at 12 and 13.
345. NAO Refuses to Review Charges that Sony's Work Shifts Violate Mexican Labor
Standards, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 201, at D-4 (Oct. 20, 1994).
346. Id.
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The Sony complaint, apparently took into consideration the lessons
learned from the first two submissions reviewed. Although a company's
activities were the basis of the allegations, a heavier emphasis was placed on
the allegations against the Mexican government.347 If the desired ministeri-
al consultations were to be recommended such a recommendation would be
based on these allegations. The Mexican government's compliance and
enforcement are the matters of concern in the NAO review .348
This more appropriately directed submission apparently used the
approach necessary to obtain an NAO recommendation that the Parties' labor
ministers meet for consultations. On April 11, 1995, the NAO recommended
such a meeting .34  The NAO concluded that the Mexican government
failed to adequately enforce its labor laws and that Sony workers were
probably fired as a result of their union organizing activities.35 This strik-
ingly different conclusion may well be a result of political pressure following
the previous decisions35" ' or simply the result of a more properly directed
complaint.
Next, through consultations the labor ministers will attempt to resolve
the dispute. Furthermore, the NAO announced recommendations for
cooperative programs on union elections and plans for a study on the
effectiveness of the Mexican CAB system.352 Based on these recommen-
dations, the NAO appears to be making the most of its limited authority,
especially regarding industrial relations matters.
It is apparent from the recent submissions that industrial relations will
remain a focus of controversy under the NAALC-ironic, considering the
more limited methods of resolution available for NAO's matters. Ideally,
industrial relations increased exposure of these issues will encourage re-
form.
353
Shortly after the first hearing, congressional leaders began debating the
presidential "fast-track authority" 35 4 that played a vital role in the passing
347. Specifically the submission states a number of labor law violations by the Mexican
government. See generally Submission 3, supra note 342, at 15-21. Among these allegations
is that the Mexican government violated the Mexican Constitution's right to free association by
denying an independent union's registration, and that the government violated fundamental
principles of international labor law and the principles of the NAALC. Submission 3, supra
note 342, at 13-21.
348. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 32.
349. Mexico Union Registration Process Faulted in U.S. NAO Report on Sony Charges,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 73, at D-3 (Apr. 12, 1995).
350. Groups Satisfied with U.S. NAO Report; Garza Says Findings Show NAFTA Working,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 71, at D-16 (Apr. 13, 1995).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., supra note 322 and accompanying text (discussing the idea that exposure
of violations may encourage reform).
354. "Fast-track authority" is authority granted to the President allowing negotiation of
trade agreements that cannot be changed in Congress. The congress may only vote for or
against the agreement once submitted for approval. This gives the President greater negotiating
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of NAFTA and the NAALC. The debate centered on whether the fast-track
authority would be renewed for future trade agreements and if matters such
as labor and the environment could be included.355 Many leaders are
urging the inappropriateness of including these non-trade related issues and
asserting that fast-track authority will not be renewed unless they are exclud-
ed.356  Congressional leaders are not alone on this issue. Negotiations
within the newly formed World Trade Organization are debating whether
labor rights should even be discussed in future trade agreements.35 Based
on these debates there appears to be criticism of the NAALC and similar
agreements from all sides of the political spectrum.
VI. CONCLUSION
In evaluating the effectiveness of the NAO reviews of union allegations
it is important to consider the context in which the reviews occur. The goal
of the review process is to further the objectives of the NAALC, whenever
possible through cooperation and consultation.358 Any attempt to better the
conditions for workers of all three Parties to the agreement is a step in that
direction. The issue is not a matter of labor against management but, rather
an opportunity to cooperatively improve labor standards. This perspective
is more reflective of the objectives set forth in the NAALC.359
The NAO report established conclusions and recommendations that,
although not necessarily pleasing to the complainants, complied with its
mandated procedural guidelines." The cooperative programs recom-
mended cannot harm the prospects for improved labor standards in Mexico.
The decision, which established that no violation by the Mexican government
occurred, did address areas that could stand improvement. Responding to
these needs, the decision provided an opportunity for affirmative action
following a decision that did not necessarily require such a response.
Although obviously subject to some criticism, the NAO reviews show
attempts at progress, especially in light of the limited power it possesses. If
abilities without threat of congressional alterations. Mark August, Trade, Not Democracy in
Spotlight, THE TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 5, 1994, at 10.
355. David R. Sands, Labor, Environment Out of Trade Picture, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1994, at B7.
356. Id.
357. Id. The World Trade Organization is comprised of approximately 120 nations and
evolved out of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
negotiations.
358. Revised Notice, supra note 28, at 16,661.
359. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
360. NAO Report, supra note 138, at 1, 2 and 7-9.
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nothing more, the NAO served the spirit of the NAALC in a diplomatic but
positive manner.
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